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ABSTRACT
My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution 
of some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of 
reconstruction and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, 
reform or transformation of the institution – is an entirely new institution 
possible? How do institutions die? – lies in the difficulty or even impossibility 
to change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions 
really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can they 
be changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What 
allows for the idea of the “new”?
I would like to explore the notion of reconstruction of our institutions, that 
is, that our institutions (European as well as others) are in poor shape and in 
need of revitalization. What is this ability to detect their state and whence the 
feeling that we deserve better ones? What is it that has changed for the institu-
tions to now be bad and overtly violent? How is the asymmetry even possible 
between the innumerable entities we ourselves produce through our mutual 
social acts and our attitudes towards them? Is it possible to speak meaning-
fully about that which we produce in relation with and to others, which lies 
between us (the public, the common good), and which can most straightfor-
wardly be designated as concerning the institution?
This body of questions refers to corrections and amendments to institutions 
we, in conjunction with others, have created or inherited. How can we change 
institutions? Can old institutions stand simultaneously with new ones? How 
do institutions even die? If institutions serve to ensure and safeguard a specif-
ic set of transactions among ourselves, who ought to be and who can possibly 
be the subject of this change? 
Yet all these complex questions are preceded by two other ones regarding the 
institution of institutions and institutional analysis: What is it that initiates or is 
the condition for any and all thematization of the institution? What is the pre-
amble of any possible institutional analysis? In his 1930 Autobiographie, Marcel 
Mauss says that he is above all interested in common work, being part of a team 
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(group), and in following the belief that collaboration with others brings much 
more than pretentious solitary and isolated search for originality (Mauss 1979: 
209–210). If we reconstructed all of Mauss efforts and projects, from the various 
ritual, collective acting or institutions to the grandiose project of overcoming 
capitalism and competition through engagement for cooperatives (commons), 
we would see that his interest is always connected with the “act of a collective 
nature [acte de nature collective]” or “individual acts of a collective nature [les 
actes individuels de nature collective]”. Which is further to say, his interest is al-
ways for the largest form of collective activity, “the nation or the very meaning 
of the social [la nation ou le sense du social]”.1 We can compare his critical and 
engaged project, with the various great collective critical projects and actions 
from the past: from Madame de Staël, Saint-Simon and Marx through Inter-
national Associations, Paul Otlet, the Institute for Social Research, the Praxis 
School, to critical and social engagement of scholars applying for European hu-
manities grants and the International Consortium of Critical Theory Programs. 
My own interest is certainly to reconstruct projects of intellectual association, 
that is universal, non-violent, urgent and obligation-producing (i.e. engaged: 
von Jhering uses a potentially analogous term in 1886, die active Solidarobliga-
tion [1969: 409–464]). And European. Among the diverse conditions implied by 
critical practice – resistance, negation, the concrete, totality (“ruthless criticism 
of all that exists”), change, decision, judgment, project, the radical, subversion, 
the universal, public, confrontation or “pseudo-activity” and resignation – en-
gaging in critique always assumes the existence of a group, its urgent formation 
and the obligation of the group’s members to participate in the articulation of 
collective critical action as a plural subject. Here is a sketch of a proposal for 
the reconstruction of the idea of collective intellectual work in three steps (each 
contributing to the introduction into any potential institutionalism):
existence of the group
 a) critique is collective and it can only be efficiently conducted by the group 
of subjects. Transfer of agency from subject to critically engaged sub-
jects, and then to the group as subject determines whether something is 
critique or not; that is, it is critique only if it is structured as ‘our plan’ 
(unser Plan) and can become, as Marx wrote to Ruge, ‘our affair’ (unsere 
Sache) (Marx 1982 [1843]: 486–489);
1  Long before Husserl and Adolf Reinach, Mauss is practically the first to thematize 
“l’acte sociale”. “Ultimately, without being obligatory, magic rites are nevertheless so-
cial. Obligation properly speaking is not for us the distinctive characteristic of things, 
of social acts and sentiments. We still regard the illicit magic act as social, without con-
tradiction. This act is social because it retains the social form, which would not have 
meaning without it [Enfin, sans être obligatoires, les rites de la magie sont néanmoins so-
ciaux. L’obligation proprement dite n’est pas pour nous le caractère distinctif des choses, 
des actes et des sentiments sociaux. L’acte magique illicite reste pour nous social, sans qu’il 
y ait là contradiction. L’acte est social parce qu’il tient sa forme de la société et qu’il n’a de 
raison d’être que par rapport à elle]” (Hubert & Mauss 1908: 186).
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urgency
 b) critique is urgent: crisis demands an urgent reaction by individuals to 
rapidly constitute themselves as a group and mitigate a crisis. If the cri-
sis occurs as a combination of negative social acts and dispersed indi-
vidual critiques, true critique, “as central motif of spirit” (als zentrales 
Motiv des Geistes) (Adorno), is the answer of the group that forms itself 
at the moment it announces “the crisis event” (Adorno 2003: 785–793);
engagement
 c) critique consists of engaged acts when it obligates to urgent action. It 
obligates not only members of the group, but all future, inactive mem-
bers/parts of the human community (“global commitment,” J. Butler).
Marcel Mauss’ thematization or reconstruction of the ‘institution’ is phil-
osophical-anthropological and of course precedes Malinowski’s and that of 
Mary Douglas, whose writing on the institution is also inspired. It implicit-
ly contains all these mentioned steps,2 but also carries several important and 
probably first models for understanding the institution today. It is, in other 
words, entirely current. I will list the models as well:3
Institutions depend on one another [Les institutions dépendent les unes des  autres] 
(Fauconnet-Mauss 1901: 167–168).
Comparative history of law and religion has revealed the idea that certain in-
stitutions in combination with institutions comprise a system, and that none 
can be transformed without the others also transforming” [L’histoire comparée 
du droit, des religions, a rendu commune l’idée que certaines institutions forment 
avec certaines autres un système, que les premières ne peuvent se transformer sans 
que les secondes se transforment également] (Fauconnet & Mauss 1901: 167).
It is clear that the connections among the wills of individuals rule over 
individuals.
Such interdependence of phenomena would be inexplicable as the product of 
particular, more or less capricious, wills; the interdependence is explained, on 
the contrary, as the product of impersonal forces that dominate the individuals 
[Cette interdépendance des phénomènes serait inexplicable s’ils étaient les produits 
2  In “La magie”, Mauss continues: “We seek first of all to understand the institutions, 
that is, the rules of public conduct and thought. In sacrifice – the public face of the 
institution – the collective nature of the act and its representations is quite clear [Nous 
nous proposions au début de nos études, surtout de comprendre des institutions, c’est-à-
dire des règles publiques d’action et de pensée. Dans le sacrifice, le caractère public de 
l’institution, collectif de l’acte et des représentations est bien clair]” (Hubert & Mauss 
1908: 187)
3  They are in an early text authored with Paul Fauconnet (Fauconnet & Mauss 1901: 
165–176). 
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de volontés particulières et plus ou moins capricieuses; elle s’explique au contrai-
re s’ils sont les produits de forces impersonnelles qui dominent les individus eux-
mêmes]  (Fauconnet & Mauss 1901: 168).
The institution is always connected to coercion.
A rule to which an individual is considered submitted cannot be the work of that 
individual: for all obligation implies a higher authority to the obligated subject, 
which inspires respect in him, an essential element of the feeling of obligation. 
Excluding interventions by supernatural beings, it is impossible to find, outside 
and below the individual, any source of obligation other than society, or rather 
the totality of societies to which he belongs [Une règle à laquelle l’individu se 
considère comme soumis ne peut être l’œuvre de cet individu : car toute obligation 
implique une autorité supérieure au sujet obligé, et qui lui inspire le respect, élé-
ment essentiel du sentiment d’obligation. Si donc on exclut l’intervention d’êtres 
surnaturels, on ne saurait trouver, en dehors et au-dessus de l’individu, qu’une 
seule source d’obligation, c’est la société ou plutôt l’ensemble des sociétés dont il 
est membre] (Ibid.).
The institutional precedes the individual or individuals.
[…] all forms of acting and thinking the individual finds pre-established and 
whose transmission is conducted most often by way of education are social [sont 
sociales toutes les manières d’agir et de penser que l’individu trouve préétablies et 
dont la transmission se fait le plus généralement par la voie de l’éducation] (Ibid.).
The name for social facts is institution.
It would be good if a particular word designated these special facts, and it seems 
that the word institutions would be most appropriate. After all, what is an in-
stitution if not the totality of acts or ideas, all presenting themselves to, and 
imposing themselves more or less on individuals? There is no reason to exclu-
sively reserve, as it is customarily done, this expression to fundamental social 
arrangements [Il serait bon qu’un mot spécial désignât ces faits spéciaux, et il 
semble que le mot institutions serait le mieux approprié. Qu’est-ce en effet qu’une 
institution sinon un ensemble d’actes ou d’idées tout institué que les individus 
trouvent devant eux et qui s’impose plus ou moins à eux? Il n’y a aucune raison 
pour réserver exclusivement, comme on le fait d’ordinaire, cette expression aux 
arrangements sociaux fondamentaux] (Ibid.).
The institution, however, is not the past; it lives. Institutions transform. 
“Nothing comes from nothing [Rien ne vient de rien]” (Fauconnet & Mauss 
1901: 169).
But, one might say, the institution is in the past; it is, by definition, a fixed en-
tity, not a living one. […] Nothing comes from nothing: new institutions cannot 
be made but from older ones, for those are the only extant. […] True institutions 
live, which is to say, change incessantly [Mais, dira-t-on, l’institution est le passé; 
c’est, par définition, la chose fixée, non la chose vivante. […] Rien ne vient de rien 
: les institutions nouvelles ne peuvent être faites qu’avec les anciennes, puisque 
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celles-ci sont les seules qui existent. […] Les institutions véritables vivent, c’est-à-
dire changent sans cesse] (Fauconnet & Mauss 1901: 168–169).
There is nothing outside institutions.
The only facts one might without reason consider social, yet which would nev-
ertheless be difficult to place within the definition of institutions, are those pro-
duced in societies without institutions. Yet the only societies without institu-
tions are social aggregates, unstable and ephemeral (such as a mob of people), or 
else those undergoing formation. In neither case do we have societies properly 
speaking, but only societies in becoming [Les seuls faits que l’on pourrait non 
sans raison regarder comme sociaux et qui, cependant, rentreraient difficilement 
dans la définition des institutions, sont ceux qui se produisent dans les sociétés 
sans institutions. Mais les seules sociétés sans institutions sont des agrégats soci-
aux ou bien instables et éphémères comme les foules, ou bien en cours de forma-
tion. Or des unes et des autres on peut dire qu’elles ne sont pas encore des sociétés 
proprement dites, mais seulement des sociétés en voie de devenir ] (Fauconnet & 
Mauss 1901: 169).
We find these basic designations of the institution in the classic text co-au-
thored by Mauss and Fauconnet. They could once again be classified and re-
duced to a few directions. Institutions are under constant change, and change 
is their first characteristic (they transform, they are dynamic and living; as 
such, they represent a collection of acts or actions, etc.); institutions possess 
and produce strength and power, yet are resistant to violent protocols that 
stand at their origin (it is probably easily possible to justify this hypothesis 
from Hume); and institutions are a primarily European thing or a European 
philosophical thing. This last claim, which opens a whole slew of questions, 
refers to philosophy or possibly “European philosophy” that can amend itself, 
and with itself institutions. Sundry philosophers of various schools of thought 
would comfortably and convincingly claim that philosophy follows institutions 
and vice versa, that institutions are always bespoke to thought, that is, that they 
are but a mirror of ‘thinking’. And yet the collision or discord between philos-
ophy and institutions is additionally complicated by the attribute ‘European’ 
(in the phrase “European philosophy”). It seems to me that this attribute dis-
tances us (even further) from other continents and thus from other kinds of 
understandings of institutions or real institutions: Jewish philosophy or Indian 
philosophy perhaps or probably suit the institutions of Israel and India, and 
it is difficult to speak of their institutional distinctions compared to institu-
tions of any sovereign country of Europe. Furthermore, this attribute distanc-
es us from the imperative (a philosophical imperative, no less) that different 
institutions, cities or states should always be compared. Is not Hume already 
built into the very foundations of “European philosophy?” And what is more, 
is it not a basic fact that without Hume, we would have no “European theory 
of institutions” or “institutional epistemology?” (Hume awards considerable 
importance to institutions, much more than Hobbes who reduces the mean-
ing of the noun ‘institution’ to the verb ‘to institute’.) Indeed, without Hume, it 
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would be impossible to imagine living French republicanism and institution-
alism. Without Hume, to put it bluntly, there is no Gilles Deleuze.4
I would like to briefly show how this paradox (using Rousseau’s phrase “le 
moment de l’institution”) (Rousseau 1990: 186) of change or restauration of the 
institution(s) has been thematized or problematized in the history of Europe-
an thought or philosophy (along the axis of French institutionalism: Montes-
quieu, Rousseau, Madame de Staël, Saint-Simon, Mauss). To do so, I would 
like to posit an unconditional condition of any possible institutionalism. These 
thinkers, each in their own way, have confirmed this condition of all condi-
tions, which today (or especially today) is neither obvious nor straightforward. 
In it resides the chief contrast between Hume and Hobbes, but also among the 
various German, Italian or French philosophers in history and today. This ax-
iom, perhaps the first axiom for, if you will, a “European philosophy,” could 
be formulated as follows: violence or force produces nothing or is not trans-
formed into anything (does not produce right, justice, freedom, order or in-
stitutions). In contrast to Hume, this is clear to Montesquieu, Rousseau and 
Mauss. Thus, for them, any potential notion of protest or amending institu-
tions or of restauration of institutions refers to the elimination of conflict, vi-
olence, and aggressive strategies that always already reside in institutions. In 
De la littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales, M. 
Germaine de Staël writes: 
Military spirit runs equally through all ages and countries. It is not particular to 
any nation, nor binds a people to some given institution: it ought to defend them 
all equally. Rhetoric, love of literature and art, of philosophy can make a home-
land of a territory by giving to that nation similar tastes, habits and sentiments. 
But force speeds past time and bypasses the will. Yet, by this very manner, it can 
establish nothing among men. It was often repeated during the French revolu-
tion, that tyranny was needed to establish liberty. Words of opposite meaning 
were thus put together into a mere phrase, which changed not one bit the truth 
of things. Institutions established through violence might imitate liberty in ev-
ery way except in its natural course. It is thus like a doll that might scare you 
4  It seems to me that there is no “conflittualismo anti-istituzionale ereditato dal 
post-strutturalismo francese” (Esposito 2019) and that Michel Foucault’s anti-institu-
tionalism is a completely marginal phenomenon of no importance whatsoever to struc-
turalism’s or ‘poststructuralism’s’ institutionalism or counter-institutionalism (contre-in-
stitution is both Saint-Simon’s and Derrida’s term). I have written about this in a text 
that analyzes ‘uses’ of the institution in Roberto Esposito (Bojanić 2015). Foucault is the 
origin and perfect example of this, if you like, neoliberal theater, because he is only 
concerned with his own engagement (similarly Sartre, although he sometimes vacillates). 
For him, there is no notion of collective work, collective action or collective change. 
Could anyone imagine Foucault writing applications, formulating budgets, writing final 
reports of projects or even simply asking for money for conferences, for joint work or 
for others… Foucault works for himself, and uses his perfect political connections, 
throughout the various periods of his life, quite well for his own positioning. I am even 
unconvinced that his role is particularly important in the construction of the University 
of Vincennes.
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with its resemblance: you will see in it everything but life [L’esprit militaire est 
le même dans tous les siècles et dans tous les pays; il ne caractérise point la na-
tion, il ne lie point le peuple à telle ou telle institution: il est également propre à 
les défendre toutes. L’éloquence, l’amour des lettres et des beaux-arts, la philos-
ophie, peuvent seul faire d’un territoire une patrie, en donnant à la nation qui 
l’habite les mêmes gouts, les mêmes habitudes et les mêmes sentiments. La force 
se passe du temps et brise la volonté; mais par cela même elle ne peut rien fond-
er parmi les hommes. L’on a souvent répété, dans la révolution de France, qu’il 
fallait du despotisme pour établir la liberté. On a lié par des mots un contre-sens 
dont on a fait une phrase; mais cette phrase ne change rien à la vérité des choses. 
Les institutions établies par la force imiteraient tout la liberté, excepte son mou-
vement naturel; les formes seraient comme ces modelés qui vous effrayent par leur 
ressemblance: vous y retrouves tout, hors la vie] (De Staël 1800: 29).
In addition to life, since it is already incorporated within institutions, and 
is not (as the anti-institutionalist mantra goes) opposed to them, Madame de 
Staël insists on time: force speeds it up, introducing a false and uncertain short-
term process. And she insists on will (elsewhere in her writing, the appearance 
of new institutions implies a new spirit of freedom and desire [désir]) (cfr. De 
Staël 1800: 24). She repeats, modifies and affirms as crucial, four models of 
“French institutionalism”. First, entirely original, that above all literature, new 
linguistic forms and new expressions could disrupt the asymmetry between 
thought and institutions (writing, putting pen to paper brings forth some-
thing new, and thus new institutions). Second, also never before formulated 
as succinctly as this, that it is possible “to judge institutions philosophically 
[à juger philosophiquement les institutions]” (De Staël 1800: 148).5 Otherwise, 
“philosophy is but a frivolous pastime of countries in which no enlighten-
ment pierces the institutions [la philosophie elle-même n’est qu’une occupation 
frivole dans un pays où les lumières ne peuvent pénétrer dans les institutions] » 
(De Staël 1800: 262); the third model is inherited from Montesquieu and Rous-
seau (Saint-Simon also adopts it later): that it is necessary and certainly pos-
sible to compare institutions across cities and states. A comparative model of 
study presents differences among institutions and can advance them. Finally, 
the last idea Madame de Staël thematizes refers to observing institutions in 
time, their transformation, transience, obsolescence, and death. Here is how 
she writes of chevalerie:
5  “Recall yet again the meaning I have given to the word philosophy throughout this 
work. Philosophy for me is inquiry into the principle of all political and religious insti-
tutions, analysis of characteristics and historical events, and finally, study of the human 
heart and natural rights of man. Such philosophy takes liberty as its guiding goal [Il faut 
rappeler ici de nouveau le sens que j’ai constamment attaché au mot philosophie dans le 
cours de cet ouvrage. J’appelle philosophie, l’investigation du principe de toutes les insti-
tutions politiques et religieuses, l’analyse des caractères et des évènements historiques, en-
fin l’étude du cœur humain et des droits naturels de l’homme. Une telle philosophie sup-
pose la liberté ou doit y conduire]” (cfr. De Staël 1800: 144).
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Any institution that is good at a given moment, but not for eternal reason, be-
comes incorrigibly onerous, having corrected previous wrongs. Thus, cheval-
erie was necessary to palliate military savagery through femininity and religious 
spirit. However, the order or rank of chevalerie, just like anything that divides 
instead of reuniting men, had to come to be seen as dreary as soon as it ceased 
to provide necessary remedy [Toute institution bonne relativement à tel dan-
ger du moment, et non à la raison éternelle, devient un abus insupportable, après 
avoir corrigé des abus plus grands. La chevalerie était nécessaire pour adoucir la 
férocité militaire par le culte des femmes et l’esprit religieux; mais la chevalerie, 
comme un ordre, comme une secte, comme tout ce qui sépare les hommes au lieu 
de les réunir, dut être considérée comme un mal funeste, dès qu’elle cessa d’être un 
remède indispensable] (De Staël 1800: 131).
This construction shows well how a given convention is initially established 
and regulated, enabling and ensuring transactions among members of a com-
munity and reducing militarism; and it shows how it degrades over time. If 
an ‘institution’ (is it now perhaps a little clearer what this noun designates or 
hides?), ceases to be a conduit and becomes an obstacle “that divides instead 
of uniting men [qui sépare les hommes au lieu de les réunir]”, then urgent change 
is necessary. And indeed, there is something urgent in this diagnosis of the in-
stitution that has suddenly become dreary (un mal funeste). Yet, it is also en-
tirely implicit that Madame de Staël indicates where the problem lies or where 
knowledge of the problem begins, and how to solve it. The diagnosis is simul-
taneously an urgent call to cooperation and action sent out to all members of 
the community.6 If we say that an institution must ceaselessly institutionalize 
itself (so as not to become pacified), what that means, in my opinion, is that a 
group of individuals ought to produce an entirely different kind of act (indi-
vidual and group social act) that might renew the unity of the group and en-
sure its transition into an institution (some new institution or counter institu-
tion). These I call engaged acts.7 My premise is that a novel reconstruction of 
engagement (and related terms)8 could introduce or advance or ease the shift 
into ‘social freedom’ (a term of A. Honneth). Furthermore, as in the case of Ma-
dame de Staël’s chevalier, this is another negative example that confirms the 
necessity of certain conditions, or strictly speaking norms (even if they alone 
are insufficient), for something to be labeled a ‘European Value’. For example, 
6  I think that the significance of cooperation for the institution could be Eloi Lau-
rent’s important distinction between collaboration that embodies association of useful-
ness and aims at efficiency. Cooperation, by contrast, is a sharing process of employing 
common knowledge (connaissance communes). Cfr. Laurent 2018.
7  Cfr. Bojanić 2019.
8  Two years ago, La Stampa published a lecture by Norberto Bobbio from 1997 about 
the relation of the intellectual and power. Interestingly, Bobbio makes simultaneous use 
of the words ‘impegno’ and ‘l’engagement’. “Bobbio: filosofi e tecnici, meglio tenerli 
separati,” La Stampa, 22.05.2017: “Il termine ‘impegno’ può sembrare inadatto a des-
ignare il rapporto tra l’esperto e il potere, giacché fa pensare a un’azione volontaria del 
soggetto che la compie, mentre il contributo che il tecnico dà al politico è quasi sempre 
richiesto da chi se ne serve”.
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‘European values’ does not refer to characteristics specific to Europeans, such 
as their willingness to urgently mobilize into a group and, for example, help 
one who is in harm’s way or simply resolve some problem. European values 
would be twofold and concern something else: 1) normativity, since individ-
uals must be together in order to be able to have to help one (or ones) in trou-
ble; 2) although engagement precedes the norm, it nevertheless constitutes it 
if and only if there is ‘communal engagement’, which is to say if the engage-
ment is free or willed (this is a specific aspect of obligation). Absent these acts 
of communal engagement, there can be no shift from group to institution, and 
thus no norm. If I say, for example, that the institution is actually a repertori-
um (répertoire is a relatively recent French word that means a set or list of el-
ements), this assumes that the institution comprises diverse content and that 
it is potentially defined as a collection of acts – institutional acts. 
My problem lies with the status of negative or perhaps even violent acts 
(better still, non-institutional, non-social or a-social, non-collegial acts, or 
“non-cooperative behavior”). Apart from that, I would like to try to imagine 
some kind of “institutional act” that could potentially be, at least partially, in 
disjunction with “negative acts”. Although such acts might render a group or 
institution “simply bad” (M. Gilbert), I am not certain that it is possible to elim-
inate them. However, it might be possible for “engaging acts” or some kind of 
“provocative acts” (which I would like to provisionally outline) to improve the 
institution or further institutionalize it. Not only this. My position is precise-
ly that “engaging acts” institutionalize a group (or transform a group into an 
institution) by reducing or removing negative social acts (which coincide with 
negative freedom). The more engagement, the more solid the institution. This 
paradox, which appears already in Montesquieu and Rousseau, is formulated 
more clearly by Madame de Staël.
When is the right moment for an institution? When and how begins, and 
when and how is it decreed that something ought to last and be preserved from 
time and in time? It seems to me that Montesquieu could help in determining 
what Rousseau calls “le moment de l’institution”, concerning the beginning and 
founding of the institution. Rousseau thinks that an entry in Montesquieu’s 
Considérations sur les causes de grandeur des Romain et de leur décadance is 
the paradigm the beginning of every institution should satisfy. In Du contrat 
social, Rousseau is paraphrasing the following statement.
At the birth of societies, it is the heads of republics who found institutions; 
from then on it is institutions that form heads of republics [Dans la naissance 
des sociétés, ce sont les chefs des républiques qui font l’institution, et c’est ensuite 
l’institution qui forme les chefs des républiques] (Rousseau 1990: 380).
I would leave aside the heads who found the institution (here in the singu-
lar). I am interested in the way Rousseau tries to transform this already shifted 
causality in Montesquieu’s sentence. The head makes something that will con-
strain and limit him. Norms form the one who declares or establishes them. An 
institution is an institution only if it satisfies the following condition: it must 
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form those who have the capacity to establish it, and this only after it itself has 
been established. Otherwise, it is not an institution and no institutional estab-
lishing has taken place. Rousseau takes another turn, indelibly disrupting the 
linear causality with an opaque scholastic combination. In the following pas-
sage, the people is sovereign (the head), but this time, the result of laws and 
institutions, the consequence to the people has to precede the institutional act. 
Thus, the people must already be formed prior to the establishing of laws and 
institutions. Rousseau’s motivation here is still an attempt to purify the estab-
lishment of institutions and sovereignty of any form of violence:
For a newly formed people to feel the reasonable rules of politics and follow 
the fundamental reasoning of the State, the effect needs to become the cause, 
the social spirit which ought to be the result of the institution needs to preside 
over the institution itself, and men need to already be that which the law would 
make them become. In that way the Sovereign could use neither force nor ratio-
nalization, he would have to turn to an authority of a different order, one that 
could lead without force and persuade without convincing. [Pour qu’un peuple 
naissant put goûter les saines maximes de la politique et suivre les regles fonda-
mentales de la raison d’Etat, il faudroit que l’effet put devenir la cause, que l’es-
prit social qui doit être l’ouvrage de l’institution présidât à l’institution même, 
et que les hommes fussent avant les loix ce qu’ils doivent devenir par elles. Ainsi 
donc le Législateur ne pouvant employer ni la force ni le raisonnement, c’est une 
nécessité qu’il recoure à une autorité d’un autre ordre, qui puisse entraîner sans 
violence et persuader sans convaincre] (Rousseau 1990: 383).
Such constructions are quite rare in the history of European thought, as 
they seem to correspond very well to the complications we all encounter with 
restauration of institutions and with a universal theory of institutions. Rous-
seau tells us that “the communal spirit that ought to be the result of institu-
tions precedes the institution itself, and requires that men be before law what 
the law is to make of them [que l’esprit social qui doit être louvrage de l’insti-
tution présidât à l’institution même, et que les hommes fussent avant les loix 
ce qu’ils doivent devenir par ells]”. Fifty years later, Saint-Simon writes down 
his vision of “the institution of Europe”, but relies on Montesquieu’s formula 
to do so. Were we to confirm and take up Saint-Simon’s idea that philosophy 
of the 21st century ought to be organizational, with a very strong power to in-
stitutionalize and protect various institutions, and were we to reorganize and 
amend Saint-Simon’s vision of Europe, we would immediately encounter two 
paradoxes. The first dilemma or problem would regard the existence of two 
parallel kinds of institutions, the old and new, and whether such a state, that 
can sometimes be a state of violence on everyone’s mind and lips, is some-
thing truly transitory. Regardless of Saint-Simon saying that old institutions 
disappear, the new European institution only partially and occasionally takes 
their place and limits them. How is this possible? The second paradox, that 
Saint-Simon mentions, and I would call fatal, refers to a line from Montes-
quieu, that “the institution forms people” (c’est l’institution qui forme les hom-
mes). How is possible, then, for those same people, at the same time to create 
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some new and different institutions? Here is the passage in which Saint-Si-
mon presents this difficulty:
It is the institution that forms men, says Montesquieu. Thus, a penchant for ex-
tending patriotism beyond the bounds of the homeland, a practice of consider-
ing the interests of Europe, rather than national interests, would be a required 
result of those who would compose the European parliament. This is true. Yet, 
it is also men who form institutions, and the institution cannot be established 
if it does not find them already completely formed, or at least prepared to be 
so [C’est l’institution qui forme les hommes, dit Montesquieu; ainsi, ce penchant 
qui fait sortir le patriotisme hors de bornes de la patrie, cette habitude de con-
sidérer les intérêts de l’Europe, au lieu des intérêts nationaux, sera pour ceux qui 
doivent former le parlement européen, un fruit nécessaire de son établissement. 
Il est vrai : mais aussi ce sont les hommes qui font l’institution, et l’institution 
ne peut s’établir si elle ne les trouve tout formés d’avance, ou du moins préparés à 
l’être] (Saint-Simon 1998: 36).
If Europe, that is, the European institution, forms people (Europeans), then 
this penchant or practice (ce penchant; cette habitude) of the institution forming 
people has as a consequence that patriotism surpasses the borders of states, 
and that European interest has replaced national interest. Surpassing the bor-
ders of nation states in this passage implies at least two new protocols: a great-
er openness of national states and hospitality for all citizens of Europe, and 
of course, the process of expansion of Europe by opening its new future bor-
ders beyond any European patriotism. The problem occurs in the second sen-
tence of this fragment by Saint-Simon. Since it is people who form the insti-
tution, and the institution forms people as they are forming and constructing 
it, Saint-Simon assumes that the idea or form of this new institution already 
pre-exists in the minds of those who are soon to form it. In other words, the 
institution can be formed only if it “finds” people already prepared and edu-
cated to make it (or at least ready to make the institution and be formed by it 
as they form it). The problem or paradox of the institution as a subject of this 
second sentence, the institution that can already find (trouver) people who are 
ad hoc formed by the very institution (without it even existing yet), returns us, 
yet again, to the idea of dual or parallel institutions. Only once does Saint-Si-
mon use the phrase “doubles institutions,” in the very fragment that interests 
us, where he also only the one time uses the phrase “les contre-institutions”.9
Here then are the various protocols initiated by a restauration of institu-
tions.10 Their differentiation is in the perspective of the actors’ actions: indi-
9  Cfr. Bojanić 2016.
10  The 18th century, already the century of revolution is also always the century of in-
stitutionalization and restauration. What is ‘restaurant’? Originally, food, “meat-based 
consommés intended to ‘restore’ a person’s strength.” Such strength or institutional ca-
pacity is, as we know, ultimately very limited. Institutions die. The mortality of those 
who feed is trivial. However, not trivial is that “a person’s strength” is restored by eat-
ing together or in others’ presence. We should always return to the group which implies 
restitution and vice versa.
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viduals, sets or aggregates of individuals, or acts of the group as such. First, 
restauration always concerns an attempt at removal of violence from institu-
tions by way of engaging everybody in the esprit social. Second, the relation 
between old and new institutions poses the problem of double institutions 
and counter-institutions. Third, the discovery of the institution of Europe as 
counter-institution, simultaneously coexisting with any institution, allows for 
the limiting of direct influence of institutions on one another and reduction 
of the possibility of conflict.
translated by Edward Djordjevic
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Petar Bojanić
Institucionalna promena i paradoks (restitucije i) restauracije institucije
Apstrakt
U ovom tekstu mi je namera da pokazem najvažniji prilog nekih francuskih filozofa i antro-
pologa u vezi sa rekonstrukcijom i poboljšanjem institucija. Paradoks promene, reforme ili 
transformacije institucije (da li je moguća potpuno nova institucija i kako umiru institucije?) 
zasniva se na teškoći ili nemogućnosti da se promeni nesto što manifestuje ono sto mi kao 
grupa jesmo. Ako institucije predstavljaju ili pokazuju zapravo relacije koje postoje između 
svih nas, kako je moguće menjati ih? Odakle kapacitet za promenu i kako je uopšte moguća 
ideja „novog“?
Ključne reči: institucija, angažman, promena, restauracija, Evropa
